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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
DIRECTORIAL GROUP ACTION AND LEGAL
RESPONSIBILITY
IRVING M. MEHLER*
One of the important pillars of the modern corporate structure
is sound corporate management. Concerted group action as a vital
force behind diversified corporate activity has tended to cast a hue
of pallor over the oft-quoted but misleading definition that the cor-
poration "is an artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing
only in contemplation of law."' The equally oft-quoted but specious
description that a corporation is a "legal.fiction" is also steadily los-
ing ground by virtue of the fact that present day corporations by
force of concerted group action account for not a small segment of
the commercial activity that takes place over the entire face of the
globe. The contention that the corporation is a mere metaphor, a
fiction, has also been refuted by historical considerations. 2
Intangibility is said to be an essential feature of corporate exist-
ence. But then again, no more so than many other forms of eco-
nomic objects or values of our society. One need go no further than
to delve into property rights which are generally expressed in the
form of paper documents. Nevertheless, it cannot be gainsaid that
they have their deeper reality in their legal recognition and accept-
ance in our present day society. The nebulous theory that the cor-
poration is a "mere mental conception" has already been vigorously
challenged on more than one occasion.'
Since the corporate entity satisfies the test of personality in hav-
ing capacity for legal rights and duties, it is most natural to treat it
as though it were a person, with a slowly growing recognition that
the analogy is more real than ficticious. The Promethean aspect of
corporate activity as a vital factor in the economic stratosphere can-
riot be separated from the individuals who in legal recognition con-
situte a unity or oneness in reference to group action. For when
unified directional groups become active in daily economic spheres
of endeavor, there is little escape from ascribing legal reality to the
collective group capacity of those individuals who comprise the
particular group.4 It is the legal responsibilities flowing from such
0 LL.B., St. John's University; LL.M., Brooklyn Law School; J.D., University of Chi-
cago. Assistant Dean and Professor of Law, Westminister College of Law, Denver, Colo-
rr.do. Member of Colorado, New York and Supreme Court Bars.
I. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 536
(1819).
2. Maine, Ancient Law (4th Ed.) 181.
3. Raymond, The Genesis of the Corporation, 19 Harv. L. Rev. 350 (1906).
4. Id. at 354.
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directional group action so basically inherent in corporate manage-
ment that this paper will attempt to explore.
I. Corporate Management and Group Action
It is fundamental that the management functions of a corporation
are vested in its board of directors.' The board, as a collective
group, are the determinants of its basic policies and may be com-
pared to the general staff of a military command in whom reside
the powers for top level planning and peremptory action. Their
power to do particular acts is vested in them, not individually, but
as a board. Should they act separately or in an individual capacity,
or at a meeting which lacks legal sanction, the corporation as an
entity will not be bound.( The law has recognized the importance
of group thinking and planning by the board of directors to such a
certain degree that only the concerted legal action of the board
acting as such will be held to be binding on the corporation. The
corporation, on the other hand, may estop itself from denying the
validity of unconcerted group action, or may ratify the acts of the
individual directors by receiving and accepting the benefits of their
acts.-,
The reasoning that underlies the rule that the separate action of
all taken independently is unenforcible board action, is well set
forth by the court in the case of Ames v. Goldfield Merger Mines
Co., as follows:
"The stockholders of a corporation have a right to expect
from their directors a conscientious consideration of every pro-
position which is presented which involves any interest of the
company, in conformity to the oath to which they have sub-
scribed. They have a right to have the individual viewpoint of
the several directors expressed at a conference, for the purpose
of obtaining the exchange of view of the several persons in
arriving at conclusions after deliberate consideration of any
issue. It is fundamental that officers of boards can only act as
such constituted boards when assembled as such, and by de-
liberate and concerted action dispose of the issue under con-
sideration, and that they cannot act in an individual capacity
outside of a formal meeting, and a majority of the individual
5. Beveridge v. New York El. Ry., 112 N.Y. 1, 19 N.E. 489 (1889); Continental
Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N. Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912); Elggren v. Woolley, 64
Utah 183, 228 Pac. 906 (1924).
6. See Baldwin v. Canfield, 26 Minn. 43, 1 N. W. 261, 276 (1897), in which a con-
veyance of land belonging to a corporation was held ineffectual because it was executed in
the name of the corporation by all directors acting separately and not as a board.
7. C. A. Dodge Co. v. Western Ave. Tabernacle Baptist Church, 247 Mass. 330, 142
N. E. 64 (1924); Electrical Products Consolidated v. El Campo, Inc., 105 Mont. 386, 73
P.2d 199 (1937); Hubbard v. Camperdown Mills, 26 S.C. 581, 2 S. E. 576 (1887);
Trethewey v. Green River Gorge, 17 Wash.2d 697, 136 P.2d 999 (1943).
8. 227 Fed. 292, 301 (W. D. Wash. 1915).
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expressions be the action of the board. The law believes that
the greatest wisdom results from conference and exchange of
individual views, and it is for that reason that the law requires
the united wisdom of a majority of the several members of the
board in determining the business of a corporation . .."
The rule was further enunciated in the case of Jackson v. Repub-
lic Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,9 as follows:
"It is elementary law that a director of a corporation has no
authority to obligate it by the mere fact that he is a director.
The corporate authority is exercised by the board itself, not by
the individuals comprising its personnel."
And in Lawrence v. Montgomery Gas Co.,1° the rule was again
clearly set forth in the following manner:
"The directors of a corporation cannot separately and indi-
vidually give consent to or make a contract to bind the corpora-
tion; they can act only as a body, their power being not joint
and several, but only joint."
The authorities are therefore in agreement that the governing
body of a corporation, as such, are agents of the corporation only
as a board, and not individually. Hence it follows that they have
no authority to act collectively save when assembled at a duly con-
vened board meeting; and the separate action of the persons com-
prising the directorial body is therefore not the action of the duly
constituted collective group."
A. Exceptions to the Rule of Group Action
The general rule that a corporation cannot act except through
the concerted group action of the board of directors at a duly con-
vened meeting is subject to numerous exceptions. An important one
is custom and usage. Hence, it has been held, that formal meetings
of directors were not necessary where their usual course of business
was to act informally. 12 The courts have also stated that a fairly
consistent course of informal dealing may bring into play the doc-
trine of estoppel so as to prevent unjust enrichment in reference
to those persons who unwittingly relied on this informal pattern.1 '
XV7here directors were permitted to establish a custom of assenting
individually to the making and performance of contracts by their
9. 138 Kan. 571, 27 P.2d 296, 297 (1933); Citizens' Securities Co. v. Hammel, 14
Cal. App. 564, 112 Pac. 731 (1910); But see Denver & Colorado Inv. Co. v. Rudolph, 47
Colo. 380, 107 Pac. 816 (1910) where two directors signed a mortgage and the other be-
ing consulted in regard thereto did not object, it was held sufficient.
10. 88 W. Va. 352, 106 S.E. 890 (1921).
11. Sargent & Co. v. Heggen, 195 Iowa 361, 190 N. W. 506 (1922).
12. Baker v. Smith, 41 R. I. 17, 102 Atl. 721 (1918); Kozy Theater Co. v. Love, 191
Ky. 595, 231 S.W. 249 (1921).
13. First National Bank of Burns v. Frazier, 143 Ore. 662, 22 P.2d 325 (1933);
Buckley v. Jennings, 95 Vt. 205, 114 AtI. 40 (1921).
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agents, this was held to constitute a waiver of the necessity of a
formal meeting of the board for the purpose of transacting the busi-
ness of the corporation. And the acceptance by the stockholders of
the benefits of the irregular action taken by the board of directors
has been held to constitute a ratification of the action so taken.4
The doctrine that the directors must act as a board at a duly
constituted meeting in order to bind the corporation is subject to
the further exception of the case of the single stockholder who owns
substantially all the shares of the company. And it has been held
that where all the stock is owned by one person, the rule of col-
lective action ceases to be important and no formal corporate action
is, as a general rule, necessary: as formal action by officers of a
corporation is generally for the protection of stockholders.1'
Another exception to the general rule which requires collective
action by the board of directors at a duly convened meeting is the
instance where all the corporate stock is owned by the directors."
Accordingly, it has been maintained that the execution of a lease
without the formal sanction of the board at a duly convened meet-
ing was a valid execution where all the corporate stock was in the
hands of the directors. 17
The authorization by statute that permits certain acts to be done
by the directors acting otherwise than as a duly constituted board is
further exception to the general rule which requires concerted
group action.' Conversely, it has been held that shareholders can-
not waive the requirement of collective group action by the board
acting as unified body, if the statutory provisions would thereby be
violated. 9
Investing the executive officers of a company with the powers of
the directors as the customary method of conducting business;2°
acquiring the separate consent of all the directors;2 1 and ratification
by vote or acquiescence upon full disclosure of the circumstances"-,
14. Holcombe v. Trenton White City Co., 82 N.J. Eq. 122, 82 AtI. 618 (1912), afl'd,
82 N.J. Eq. 364, 91 Atl. 1069 (1913).
15. Vennerbeck & Clase Co. v. Juergens Jewelry Co., "53 R. I. 135, 164 Atl. 509
(1933).
16. Jordan v. Collins, 107 Ala. 572, 18 So. 137 (1895).
17. Temple Enterprises v. Combs, 164 Ore. 133, 100 P.2d 613 (1940).
18. Mich. Gen. Corp. Act, Sec. 13(4c) provides that if the directors shall severally
and/or collectively consent in writing to any action to be taken by the corporation such
action shall be valid corporate action as though it had been authorized at a meeting of 'he
directors; see also Maryland Corporation Act, Sec. 54 (1951).
19. Audenried v. East CoaSt Milling Co., 68 N. J. Eq. 450, 59 AtI. 577 (1904).
20. Barkin Construction Co. v. Goodman, 221 N.Y. 156, 116 N.E. 770 (1917).
21. National State Bank v. Sandford Fork & Tool Co., 157 Ind. 10, 60 N.E. 699
(1901); Corrill v. Creenlecs, 104 Kan. 693, 180 Pac. 798 (1919).
22. Morisette v. Howard, 62 Kan. 463, 63 Pac. 756 (1901). But see First Trust &
Savings Bank v. Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co., 98 F.2d 416, 427 (8th Cir. 1938) where it
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bave all been held to be additional instances where non-concerted
group action has been held to be binding on the company, and
hence deemed to be valid exceptions to the general rule which re-
quires concerted group action by the board of directors duly con-
vened as such.
B. Delegation of Authority to Executive Committee
The multifarious needs of a corporation ofttimes necessitates the
delegation of managerial functions by directors to others. It has
therefore been held that the board as such, may delegate their
authority to officers of the corporation,-'2 to an executive commit-
tee, 2 4 to one of their own board members or even at times to those
having no affiliation with the corporation. -" Especially in reference
to the needs of large corporations, it is a matter of common knowl-
edge that directors cannot give their personal attention to all the
details of the company. Normally, the articles of incorporation and
the bylaws provide for the appointment of an executive committee.
And a resolution of the board of directors, either specifically defi-
ning the powers of the particular committee or granting them
plenary powers will be sufficient to delegate the authority.2 It has
also been held that "the directors have the power, without statutory
authority, to delegate to officers, agents or an executive commitee
the power to transact, not only ordinary and routine business, but
business requiring the highest degree of judgment and discretion.."27
As indicated by recent laws and decisions, the trend relating to the
delegation of powers by boards to others, is toward a more liberal
cxtension of such powers.2 1 As in the case of the board of directors,
an executive committee can act only as a unified or collective group.
And although not formally convened, there have even been instan-
ces where the lack of a formal meeting has not invalidated the writ-
ten consent of all the members of the group subsequently given. 29
was held that the acquiescence of the stockholders obtained without full disclosure does not
excuse or ratify a fraud.
23. Hoyt v. Thompson's Executor, 19 N.Y. 207 (1859).
24. Union Pacific R. R. v. Chicago, P. R. R., 163 U. S. 564 (1895); Sheridan Electric
Light Co. v. Chatham Nat'l Bank, 127 N.Y. 517, 28 N.E. 467 (1891). Modem statutes
permit delegation to an executive committee. See N. Y. Stock Corporation Law, § 60;
Ohio General Code, §§ 8623-60; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-2-1 (1953).
25. In re Lone Star Shipbuilding Co., 6 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1925). Contra, Long Park
v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E. 2d 633 (1948), noted
61 Harv. L. Rev. 1251 (1948).
26. Haldeman v. Haldeman, 176 Ky. 635, 197 S. W. 376 (1917). Contra, Temple v.
Dodge, 89 Tex. 69, 32 S.W. 514 (1895).
27. Jones v. Williams, 139 Mo. 1, 25, 39 S.W. 486, 490 (1897).
28. San Antonio Joint Stock Land Bank v. Taylor, 129 Tex. 335, 105 S.W. 2d 650,
654 (1937).29. Caldwell v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n., 53 App. Div. 245, 6 N.Y. Supp.
826 (1900).
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Unless otherwise provided, a majority constitutes a quorum; and
two members of the executive committee may act without the pres-
ence or consent of the third. Generally, it may be stated that a
committee of a corporation is subject to the same rules as the
directors.3"
C. Limitation on Delegation of Authority to Executive Committee
Although the exigencies of corporate management generally
necessitate the power in the board of directors to delegate their
au~thority,"1 it has been held that the board cannot abdicate com-
pletely by delegating supervision and control of the company t& an
executive committee unless expressly authorized to do so. To per-
mit complete abdication by the board by the transference of its
authority to an executive committee is contrary to custom and is
inconsistent with the articles of incorporation or other statutory
l.w which requires that the general supervision and control shall
be vested in a board of directors. '.2 In a case where the board of
directors of an insurance company surrendered their entire author-
ity to a management company for a perod of twenty years, the con-
tract of surrender was held void on grounds of public policy. In
its opinion,"3 the court distinguished a Missouri case" where "the
board of directors relinquished their power to determine the edi-
torial policy of the newspaper to a managing editor of a newspaper
iublishing company for a period of five years, The distinction, the
court pointed out, was that in the latter case it was not held to be
a relinquishment of the entire control of the company, whereas in
the former case it was, due to the inordinate period of time in
which managerial control by the board was absent. The function
of an executive committee is to aid the board of directors in its
corporate managerial functions. Its creation may not be utilized to
either usurp or supersede the regular functions of the board.
II. Legal Responsibilities of Corporate Management
Corporate control and management largely entails duties of a
fiduciary nature. Directors, as the central power of management,
stand in a fiduciary capacity to the body of shareholders and their
economic interests. The United States Court of Appeals in the case
30. Wingate v. Bercut, 146 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1944).
31. McNeil v. Boston Chamber of Commerce, 154 Mass. 277, 282, 28 N.E. 245
(1891).
32 Lane v. Bogert, 116 N.J. Eq. 454, 174 At. 217 (1934).
33. Sherman & Ellis, Inc. v. Indiana Mut. Cas. Co., 41 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1930),
ccrt. denied 282 U.S. 893 (1930).34. Jones v. Williams, 139 Mo. 1, 39 S. W. 486 (1897).
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of Ashman v. Miller"' commented upon this principle and its ration-
ale in the following manner:
"A director of a corporation occupies a fiduciary relation to it
and its stockholders. His position is one of trust and he is fre-
quently denominated a trustee and so held accountable in
equity. The ordinary trust relationship of directors of a corpo-
ration and stockholders is not a matter of statutory or technical
law. It springs from the fact that directors have the control and
guidance of corporate business affairs and property and hence
of the property interests of the stockholders.. Equity recognizes
that stockholders are the proprietors of the corporate interests
and are ultimately the only beneficiaries thereof. Those inter-
ests are in virtue of the law intrusted through the corporation
to the directors and from that condition arises the trusteeship
of the directors with the concomitant fiduciary relationship."
Ingrained in this fiduciary relationship are two important touch-
stones of conduct to which equity holds directors in their manage-
ment of corporate affairs. These criteria are: (1) the highest loyalty
to the interests of the corporation; (2) at least reasonable care and
business prudence.'6
A. Loyalty of Directors to Corporate Interests
The duties and responsibilities of directors appertaining to their
fiduciary position to the corporation have been repeatedly stressed
by the courts. And from the decided cases certain well-settled rules
have emerged which may be concisely stated in the following man-
ner: First, directors are charged with the highest degree of good
faith and fair dealing in all transactions involving their -manage-
ment of the business affairs of the corporation. 7 Second, directors
must not act for their own financial benefit, but must act solely for
the benefit of the shareholders of the corporation. 8 And third, any
and all profits made by directors through furtive dealings involving
the transaction of corporate affairs or which involve a conflict of
personal interest and fidelity to the interests of the company .must
be accounted for by the directors to the company.
39
35. 101 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir. 1939).
36. Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 221 (1933).
37. Globe Woolen Company v. Utica Gas & Electric Co., 224 N. Y. 483, 121 N. E.
378 (1918); McMynrs v. Richardson-Phenix Co., 186 Wis. 442, 201 N. W. 272 (1924).
See also, Legal Safeguards About Transactions Between a Director and His Corporation, 83
U. Pa. L. Rev. 56 (1934).
38. Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 492 i1874); American Circular Loom
Co. v. Wilson, 198 Mass. 182, 84 N.E. 133 (1908).
39. Tenison v. Patton, 95 Tex. 284, 67 S.W. 92 (1902); Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa.
427, 91 AtI. 428 (1914). See also Bird Coal & Iron Co. v. Humes, 157 Pa. 278, 27 AtI.
750, 752 (1893), where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated the position of directors
as follows: "A director is a trustee for the entire body of stockholders, and both good
morals and good law imperatively demand he shall manage all the business affairs of the
company with a view to promote, not his own interests, but the common interests; and he
cannot, directly .or indirectly, derive any personal profit or advantage by reason of his
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In hewing to the line of fidelity to the interests of the company,
directors are expected to acquaint themselves fully with the duties
of their office. In no instance will directors be permitted to assume
that their function is merely ornamental; but on the contrary, -they
will be leld strictly to the active duties of their office and the con-
comitant legal responsibilities that their office entails. Accordingly,
directors should familiarize themselves with the provisions of the
charter and observe the requirements of the bylaws. They should
attend meetings with regularity. They should inform themselves
of the workings of the business, its products, its policy standards,
its past history, its present needs and actively participate in Chart-
ing the future goals of the company with an eye toward continued
stability and growth. The law will not tolerate the passive attitude
of directors who permit the use of their names merely as advertis-
ing adornment without active and conscientious participation in the
managerial functions of the company. As directors, it is their duty
to control and supervise the day to day business activities of the
company or to promulgate definite policies and rules of guidance
with a vigilent eye toward seeing to it that these policies are carried
out. It is only then that directors may be said to have fulfilled their
duty of fealty to the corporation. For it is the policy of the law to
encourage and enforce responsible corporate management and to
look with disfavor upon nominal directorial membership. 40
1. Breach of Fiduciary Obligation by Directors
The law is replete with variegated instances of directors who
breached their fiduciary obligation to the corporation of which they
were part. In view of this fact only a few actual cases will be set
forth to concretely illustrate instances of breach of fiduciary duty
in action. In Farwell v. Pyle-National Electric Headlight Co.,
41
where a director brought suit against his own company to enforce
a royalty contract which was to inure to his benefit rather than the
benefit of the corporation, enforcement of the contract was refused
by the court. The court stated:
position, distinct from his co-shareholder. . . And by assuming the office he undertakes
to give his best judgment in the interests of the corporation in all matters in which he acts
for it, untrammeled by any hostile interest in himself or others. There is an inherent obliga-
tion on his part that he will in no manner use his position to advance his own interests
as an individual, as distinguished from that of the corporation. . . And all secret profits
derived by him in any dealings in regard to the corporate enterprise must be accounted
for to the corporation, even though the transaction in which they were made also advant-
aged the corporation of which he was a director."
40. Kavanaugh v. Gould, 223 N.Y. 103, 119 N.E. 237 (1918). See also, Douglas,
Directors Who Do Not Direct,'47 Harv. L. Rev. 1305 (1934) and Lynch, Diligence of
Directors in the Management of Corporations, 3 Calif. L. Rev. 21 (1914).
41. 212 Ill. App. 450, aff'd, 289 Ill. 157, 124 N.E. 449 (1919).
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"It is the duty of directors to administer the corporate affairs
for the common benefit of all the stockholders, and exercise
their best care, skill and judgment in the management of the
corporate business solely in the interest of the corporation ....
They cannot have or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest
in conflict with their duty as such trustees."
' 4 2
In Wheeler v. Abilene National Bank Bldg. Co.,43 where the
board of directors approved a sale of corporate property to a
majority stockholder for a sum less than could have been obtained
from another prospective purchaser, the court held the sale void-
able at the instance of minority stockholders who had brought suit.
Other instances of breach of fiduciary obligation have occurred
where directors have used their controlling power to divert to them-
selves unissued shares for which they paid par value to the com-
pany and then made a profit by reselling the same shares to "the
public. In such cases the courts have held that the directors may be
compelled to account to the corporation for the profits made in the
transaction.4 4 In another case"3 the directors were required to sur-
render up their shares for cancellation where the court found that
they had breached their fiduciary duty.
A situation involving a breach of loyalty by directors which re-
currs quite often is one in which a director while acting for the
corporation, acquires an interest adverse to that of the corporation.
An interesting case in point is du Pont v. du Pont"6 which occurred
during the First World War. In that case the president of the com-
pany who was its largest stockholder and who was leaving for an
extended absence, offered to sell to the company a large block of
his stock at a stated price in order to insure its resale at the same
price to key employees of the company. After the proposal had
been turned down by the company's finance committee, the acting
president, by an unconscionable concealment of facts and furtive
manipulation, acquired the stock for himself and his associates. In
the meantime the stock had risen rapidly due to war conditions.
The court held that the company had the right at its election to
take over the stock purchased at the price paid and to require an
accounting for all dividends received on said shares. In its opinion,
the court set forth the following basic principle of law:
42. Id. at 452.
43. 159 Fed. 391 (8th Cir. 1908).
44. Federal Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 132 Kan. 129, 294 Pac. 859 (1931). See
also Provident Trust Co. v. Geyer, 248 Pa. 423, 94 Atl. 77 (1915), where the directors
were required to account for the profit they made, to those persons who had been share-
holders of record at the time the transaction took place.
45. Arkansas Val. Agr. Soc. v. Eichholtz, 45 Kan. 164, 25 Pac. 613 (1891).
46. 242 Fed. 98 (D. C. Del. 1917).
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"When a director attempts in violation of his duty to acquire
interests adverse to the corporation in respect to any matter
involved in the confidence which has been reposed in him, as
to which equity imposes a disability upon him to deal in his
own behalf, the court will hold him as a trustee for the corpo-
ration, and he must account for the profits which otherwise
would have accrued to the corporation."
4
7
Cases involving a conflict of directors' interests are also occas-
ionally found where directors utilize their information of the com-
pany's business affairs and planning operations for the benefit of a
competing concern. In such cases, the courts have been constantly
alert to enjoin a director from moving into a rival business which
might tend to injure or extirpate the affected corporation. The
courts have even gone as far as to sequester any property which the
disloyal director had acquired and turn it over to the hapless com-
pany.
48
Finally, problems of conflicting loyalties growing out of cases in-
volving interlocking directors have a*t times caused the courts grave
concern. In such instances the courts scrutinize agreements entered
into by corporations whose boards of directors have common mem-
bers, as minutely as they delve into transactions involving a director
and his company. Where the fairness of such contracts are chal-
lenged, the courts generally hold that those who seek to maintain
the transaction must sustain the burden of proof. 49
B. Touchstone of Reasonable Care and Business Prudence
In dealing with problems involving the care and skill required of
directors in the management of corporate affairs, the expressions
used by the courts have at times caused no less than semantic con-
fusion. Words such as "reasonable" and "prudent" are not suscep-
tible of easy definition; especially, in reference to human conduct
which is so minutely variable. Furthermore, the meaning of the
words "reasonable" and "prudent" take on different hues when deal-
ing with the variegated character of different corporations and the
nature of their business affairs.
In some states the courts have held that the directors are only
liable for "gross negligence."50 But then again what may be con-
47. Id. at 136.
48. Red Top Cab Co. v. Hanchett, 48 F.2d 236 (N.D. Cal. 1931); Coleman v.
Hanger, 210 Ky. 309, 275 S.W. 784 (1925).
49. Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590 (1921). See also Corsicana
"at'l Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68 (1919).
50. Jones v. Foster, 70 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1934); Burkhart v. Smith, 161 Md. 398,
1.57 Ad. 299 (1931); Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 8 N.E.2d
895. 904 (1937).
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sidered "gross negligence" in one case may be regarded as ordinary
negligence or possibly even slight negligence in another. Actually,
the degree of negligence depends upon what measure of care and
diligence is due and owing in the particular case. Ordinary or pos-
sibly slight negligence in a director of a manufacturing company
might at times be considered as gross negligence in the case of a
director of a bank or trust company. Hence, failure to exercise
reasonable care and prudence is always to be determined with ref-
erence to the circumstances of the particular corporation and to
some extent to the particular director. An equitable rule has there-
fore evolved that directors shall exercise such diligent care and
skill as ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar cir-
cumstances in like positions." It is well to note here that since di-
rectors cannot be expected to personally supervise all the minute
details of a going corporate concern, application of the rule does
not, of course, preclude delegation of certain duties to subordinates
by the directors. Notwithstanding the right of directors to delegate
authority, they are not free from the duty of keeping tabs on the
performance of their underlings nor are they exempt from the
necessity of exercising proper care in the choice of their subordi-
nates.
5
III. Conclusion
With the continually increasing use and growth of the corporate
structure to further business ends, legal developments in recent
years point to the imposition upon directors of an increasingly more
exacting fiduciary duty in reference to corporate management. In
those instances where the question of a director's fiduciary position
has been subject to judicial scrutiny, the courts have consistently
iefused to permit a director to obtain personal gain from a tran-
saction to the detriment of the company. Hence, an agreement be-
tween a third person and directors, whereby the latter place them-
selves in a position where their duties as officers are, or may be
in conflict with their obligation under the agreement, has been held
to be void as against public policy. 5' The directors represent all of
the stockholders and creditors and cannot enter into agreements,
either among themselves or with stockholders by which they relin-
51. Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1938); Lippitt v. Ashley, 89 Conn.
451, 94 At. 995 (1915); Anderson v. Bundy, 161 Va. 1, 171 S. E. 501, 507 (1933). See
Uniform Business Corporation Act, Sec. 33.
52. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891). For an interesting discussion on the
standard of care and skill required in corporate management, see, Rhoads, Personal Liability
ot Directors for Corporate Mismanagement, 65 U. Pa. L. Rev. 128 (1916).
53. Sauerhering v. Rseping, 137 Wis. 407, 119 N. V. 184 (1909); Koelbel v. Teck-
tonius, 228 Wis. 317, 280 N. W. 305 (1938).
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quish their independent judgment or control.". In determining
what would be the effect of such agreements, the courts will scru-
tinize the entire arrangement with a discerning eye with a view
toward ascertaining whether the agreement withdraws from the
directors that control and independent judgment of the corpo-
rate affairs and business which the statutes and the law normally
vests in them; and the good faith or intention of the parties does
not purge it of its unlawful design:-- Courts have even gone as far
as to say that the directors as trustees owe not alone the negative
duty to refrain from benefiting themselves at the expense of their
beneficiaries, the stockholders, but also owe their beneficiaries the
positive duty of saving them from loss.5" Additional proof of the
tightening of the fiduciary position of directors may also be seen
in the tendency of some courts, particularly in the western states
where the law relating to trusts has been codified, to apply to di-
rectors the statutory rules governing ordinary trustees.17 There are
also continuing indications that directors are being held account-
able by the courts for a much higher degree of care, diligence and
judgment than they were a half century ago. A director charged
with negligent mismanagement can no longer exonerate himself by
pleading good intent and honest motives.58
It is interesting to note that the trend toward holding directors to
a more stringent fiduciary duty has received its main impetus not
from judge made law but from statutory enactments passed during
the last twenty years. Corporate directors seem to have been the
"btes noires" against whom a no small portion of the legislation of
that period has been directed. And it has been asserted that this
hard-headed attitude toward directors may be partly attributed
to a rather substantial reaction against the prevalence of "direc-
tors who do not direct." 59 All in all, the trend toward imposing
upon directors a more exacting fiduciary duty seems to be a salu-
tary one; as it sharpens the awareness to responsibilities of those
assuming business leadership in their relationship toward the com-
pany and its stockholders in particular, and the public, as an ulti-
mate consumer, in general.
54. Ford v. Magee, 160 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1947).
55. Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918).
56. Bodell v. General Gas & Electric Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 420, 140 Atl. 264 (1927).
57. See North Confidence Mining & Development Co. v. Fitch, 58 Cal. App. 329, 208
Pac. 328, 329 (1922), in which the court stated: "Directors of a corporation are trustees
thereof within the meaning of section 2230 (one of the provisions of the California Civil
Code applicable to technical trustees)."
58. Note, Liability of Directors for Negligent Mismanagement, 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 364,
368 (1934).
59. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1305 (1934).
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